[NNTP] Extension snapshots 2

Ken Murchison ken at oceana.com
Tue Jan 4 10:09:21 PST 2005


Russ Allbery wrote:

> Ken Murchison <ken at oceana.com> writes:
> 
> 
>>So, do you want to prohibit this unilaterally, e.g.:
> 
> 
>>"Servers MUST NOT allow the use of MODE READER after successful
>>authentication."
> 
> 
>>Or only prohibit it on mode-switching servers, e.g.:
> 
> 
>>"Mode-switching servers MUST NOT allow the use of MODE READER after
>>successful authentication."
> 
> 
> Can we turn this around and say instead that the client MUST NOT send it
> after successful authentication?  Then there's no pressing need to say
> what the server has to do.

But only the server knows if its truely mode-switching (in lieu of a 
MODE READER capability -- which only VERSION 2 capable clients will know 
about) and the client may always send MODE READER just to cover its ass.

I'm worried about breaking existing clients (e.g. Pine) which have found 
a sequence of commands which work on almost all servers (mode-switching 
INN being the notable exception).

And if we do make a note regarding the use of MODE READER after 
authentication, do we do so only in the context of mode-switching, or 
unilaterally?

Ideally, a mode-switching server would discontinue advertising the MODE 
READER capability after TLS and/or authentication.

And perhaps we dance around this issue a little and say something like 
this in the base doc:

"If a client intends to use the MODE READER command, it SHOULD issue 
this command before any security or privacy commands are issued."

-- 
Kenneth Murchison     Oceana Matrix Ltd.
Software Engineer     21 Princeton Place
716-662-8973 x26      Orchard Park, NY 14127
--PGP Public Key--    http://www.oceana.com/~ken/ksm.pgp



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