[ietf-nntp] draft-ietf-nntpext-tls-nntp-01.txt

[Russ Allbery]

Ken Murchison <ken at oceana.com> writes:

> The server has complete control over the negotiation.  Its provides a
> list of options from which the client can choose.  The server should
> only provide those options that it is willing to accept, and shouldn't
> have to decide *after* the negotiation is complete whether or not it is
> happy with the outcome.  As a result, I think the case where TLS
> negotiation is successful but the server then refuses other commands
> with 483 (or some other code) is, and should be, nonexistent.  Either
> TLS succeeds, or it fails, period.  Obviously, if TLS fails, then
> issuing 483 for subsequent commands makes sense, but the client should
> already expect this.

This makes our lives massively easier.  Thank you for the information!
Given this, I agree that we're worrying too much about this case; the only
case that we actually have to talk about is the case where TLS negotiation
fails entirely.

-- 
Russ Allbery (rra at stanford.edu)             <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>