ietf-nntp Multiple AUTHINFOs per session
ken at oceana.com
Mon Jan 6 10:47:49 PST 2003
Russ Allbery wrote:
> Ken Murchison <ken at oceana.com> writes:
> > Russ Allbery wrote:
> >> I don't see what purpose is served in forcing clients to send a command
> >> to establish authentication when their authentication is already
> >> established on connect. Bear in mind that the common case for NNTP is
> >> still to authenticate by IP address.
> > Hmm. Once again I guess I'm not completely up to speed on NNTP
> > deployment. So, when using the IP, are you just auth'ing the host?
> To give an example, Stanford's news servers first check to see if the
> client connection is from one of the personal workstations of the system
> administrators, and if so grants access to all groups. If not, it checks
> to see if the connection is from one of Stanford's networks, and if so it
> grants access to all groups except for our internal gateways of role
> addresses and control.cancel. If both of those fail, it attempts to do an
> S/Ident callback and uses the results of that callback to establish an
> identity, granting access to all groups for administrators (so that we can
> read them from home) and otherwise granting access to all groups except
> the internal ones if the user successfully authenticates.
> S/Ident is bolted on the side, and I'd of course rather replace that part
> with something that does real SASL authentication in-band, since the
> S/Ident callback mechanism doesn't work through firewalls or NAT.
> However, the reason why we developed S/Ident in the first place is because
> it can be added to arbitrary protocols without requiring client support,
> and since we use Kerberos exclusively as an authentication mechanism, the
> chances of the average news reader supporting our authentication mechanism
> even via SASL is somewhat low.
> We don't support AUTHINFO over unencrypted connections for obvious
> reasons. If the user connects via SSL, then they're required to
> authenticate with their Kerberos username and password (at the moment
> using AUTHINFO USER / AUTHINFO PASS).
OK. Based on current deployment, there's probably no way to get around
having pre-authd connections.
> > My understanding of the use of EXTERNAL, is that the client tells the
> > server to go ahead and use whatever credentials it derived from the out
> > of band facility, instead of the server automatically using
> > them.
> I'm not sure I understand the purpose served by this, rather than letting
> the server default to using the permissions that it obtained from other
> sources but allowing the client to override with AUTHINFO.
Never mind. It probably is not a good fit for NNTP.
> >>> Of course NNTP seems to be highly allergic to conforming to what has
> >>> already been done by other protocols. ;)
> >> Hm. I'm not sure I agree, and I'm not sure what you're thinking about.
> > Most specifically, the previous discussions of SASL syntax
> Oh, that was just us trying to get up to speed on the best way of doing
> this. The SASL RFC doesn't make it at all clear what the recommended way
> of handling the protocol exchange is. I have no problem imitating SMTP,
> now that I understand the issues better.
Glad to hear it. ;)
> > and the current discussion over on ietf-822.
> That's the Usenet article format, which is a whole different ballgame
True. But I detect some of the same reluctance to change inertia on
both lists (you and Jeff notwithstanding).
> entirely. NNTP is quite a bit saner; it's a pretty straightforward
> network protocol that has a few old warts, but for the most part isn't
> that different than SMTP or POP3 (and is actually more regular than SMTP
> in some ways).
Exactly! I tried to make this point in some of my early SASL posts and
was slapped back by the "its not NNTP-like" responses. At least I know
that you and Jeff were listening and tend to agree. ;)
Kenneth Murchison Oceana Matrix Ltd.
Software Engineer 21 Princeton Place
716-662-8973 x26 Orchard Park, NY 14127
--PGP Public Key-- http://www.oceana.com/~ken/ksm.pgp
More information about the ietf-nntp